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INTRODUCTION 
 
At the beginning of 2018, Donald Trump started imposing the first tariffs. Firstly it was on 
washing machines and solar panels, then on aluminum and steel and after that he decided to 
target Chinese goods, triggering an escalation of tariffs and retaliatory tariffs that would last for 
the following two years. This trade conflict has been defined as “the biggest tariff war of the 
century”, and it will be the theme of this thesis. 
The script will start with a brief overview of the commercial relationship between the United 
States and China in the last 50 years. It will continue with a definition of what “tariff” means 
and what are the generic economic consequences of implementing such a policy. The purpose 
of this chapter is to give some context and to understand the roots behind the decision of 
imposing tariffs. 
It will then explain the tariffs in detail, dividing between solar panels and washing machines, 
steel and aluminum, and Chinese products. It will focus on the single phases that characterized 
the bilateral conflict. 
Then, through the results of some papers, it will analyze the short-run and the long-run effects 
of the tariff war among the United States, China and the other countries in general. It will focus 
on some macroeconomic indicators such as the GDP, the exportations and importations, the 
effect on prices. It will also try to understand the effect on the single sectors and to implement 
the effect of uncertainty. 
At the end, it will illustrate the latest developments and try to predict what will follow the Phase 
One Deal. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
1.1 BRIEF HISTORY OF THE COMMERCIAL RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA 
 
The United States and China are the world's two largest economies. 
The U.S. has a larger nominal Gross Domestic Product (21,439.453 billion dollars against 
China’s 14,140.163 billion dollars)1 whereas China is at the top when we consider GDP based 
on Purchasing Power Parity (27,308.857 against 21,439.453 billion dollars)2. 
China is the world's largest exporter (2,157,000 million dollars) and the United States is 
the world's largest importer ($2,352,000 million dollars)3. China is the first commercial partner 
of the USA and it is also its first importer, the USA imported over than 341,960.4 million dollars 
in goods from China in 2019 (September 2019) against the 78,762.0 million of dollars of 
exportations to China, with the result of a negative balance of -263,198.4.4 
This result is persistent, the United States has been running a trade deficit with China since the 
1980s. Before then the situation was different, in the '70s, in fact, the United States sold to 
China more products than they bought from China. For what concerns the ‘50s and the ‘60s, 
the Sino-US relation was uniformly hostile as there hasn’t been communication or diplomatic 
ties between the two countries for 25 years. 
1971 represents a turning point, in this year the President of USA, Richard Nixon revealed to 
the world that he accepted an invitation to visit the People's Republic of China. That was the 
climax of a series of events that would have brought the economic isolation of China to an end. 
Before that, happened the “ping-pong diplomacy”, this refers to the exchange of table tennis 
players between the two countries, an event that marked a thaw in Sino-US relations. 
                                                             
1 “World Economic Outlook Database, October 2019” IMF.org 
2  “World Economic Outlook Database, October 2019” IMF.org 
3  “COUNTRY COMPARISON: IMPORTS”. Central Intelligence Agency. 
https://www.cia.gov/library/Publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2087rank.html 
4 Census, Foreign Trade https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html 
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Since then, and during all the '70s, a lot of measures were adopted by the Nixon administration 
to remove restrictions on commerce and travel between the two countries. This brought not 
only to the end of the U.S. trade embargo on China but to the conferment of Most Favored 
Nation (MFN) status on China in 1980. 
The MFN status means that the country cannot be treated less advantageously than all the other 
countries with the MFN status, which implies trade advantages like low tariffs or import quotas 
“Chart 1 presents trade data for the first decade of renewed commercial activity between the 
two countries. The data show continued growth in trade with a trough in U.S. exports to China 
during 1975–1977. […] During this period, as said before, the United States sold to China 
more products than it bought from China, although America’s trade with China never 
amounted to more than 1 percent of total U.S. world trade. 
By the end of the decade, the total trade between the two nations was doubling each year, from 
US$1.1 billion in 1978 to $2.3 billion in 1979 to $4.8 billion in 1980.”5 
 
The ‘80s witnessed the restructuring of the Chinese domestic economy, which basically could 
be defined by "reform and opening": reform of the economic system and opening to foreign 
trade. 
This involved the privatization of much state-owned industries and the lifting of price controls, 
protectionist policies, and regulations. Foreign investment was legalized, the most popular kind 
of investment was joint ventures and some of the early participants were H. J. Heinz, Coca-
Cola, American Express, Gillette, Eastman Kodak. 
The role of foreign trade under the economic reforms increased far beyond its importance in 
any previous period. Trade statistics, illustrated in Chart 2 contains ambiguity “The American 
statistics show in fact, that 1986 was a turning point, with a US$1.67 billion trade deficit 
against the United States, which kicked off a deep, quarter-of-a century trade deficit with the 
People’s Republic. In stark contrast, the Chinese figures for 1986 show a more than US$1 
                                                             
5 Dong Wang; “U.S.-China Trade, 1971–2012: Insights into the U.S.-China Relationship 米中貿易 
1971〜2012年 中日関係についての洞察”; in The Asia-Pacific Journal Japan Focus; Volume 11 
Issue 24 Number 4 Article ID 3958; Jun 16, 2013 
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billion deficit against the P.R.C.—one point on the long curve of a trade deficit stretching from 
1973 through 1992.”6  
Part of this dispute can be traced back to whether American and Chinese exports and imports 
channeled through Hong Kong, over US$1.125 billion worth of goods, should legitimately be 
considered part of U.S.-China trade. 
According to the Chinese government, 60 percent of Chinese exports to the United States in the 
mid-1980s were initially consigned to buyers in Hong Kong, who then shipped them to the 
United States. They argued that the appreciation accrued through re-export markups should not 
be computed as China’s direct imports to the U.S. goods. 
“Also, before 1993 the Chinese authorities did not keep an account of the final destinations of 
goods exported through Hong Kong, which might have compromised the value and volume of 
Chinese exports to the American market.”7 
 
During the '90s the relationship was challenged by two major events: 
The first one is the “Tiananmen Square Massacre”, troops with assault rifles and tanks fired at 
the demonstrators, most of them were students and blue-collar. Estimates of the death toll vary 
from several hundred to several thousand, with thousands more wounded. 
The protest born as a march to participate in the memorial service of Hu Yaobang, a high-
ranking official of the People's Republic of China. His ideas in favor of the freedom of speech 
and freedom of the press were praised by the demonstrators, and his destitution became a 
representation of the nepotism of the elite party bureaucrats. Some other reasons can be traced 
back to the political corruption and the higher levels of inflation appeared after thirty years of 
steady prices. This was traced back to the reduction in government controls, deriving from of 
the aforementioned economic reform. During the early 1980s in fact consumers’ incomes 
                                                             
6 Dong Wang; “U.S.-China Trade, 1971–2012: Insights into the U.S.-China Relationship 米中貿易 
1971〜2012年 中日関係についての洞察”; in The Asia-Pacific Journal Japan Focus; Volume 11 
Issue 24 Number 4 Article ID 3958; Jun 16, 2013 
7 Dong Wang; “U.S.-China Trade, 1971–2012: Insights into the U.S.-China Relationship 米中貿易 
1971〜2012年 中日関係についての洞察”; in The Asia-Pacific Journal Japan Focus; Volume 11 
Issue 24 Number 4 Article ID 3958; Jun 16, 2013 
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increased because of the overall expansion in productivity and the income-earning possibilities. 
As consequence the amount of money in circulation increased fairly rapidly and unexpectedly. 
The United States Congress and media criticized this military action. In reaction to the violent 
event, President Bush suspended all government-to-government sales and commercial exports 
of weapons. 
The second event is the famous southern tour of China of Deng Xiaoping, he used these travels 
as a method of reasserting his economic policy after his retirement from office. 
This was the beginning of what could be defined as the second phase of the economic reform 
that would continue after the death of Deng in 1997, under his successors Jiang Zemin and Zhu 
Rongji. This new stage aimed at reforming the banking system, reduce inflation and ultimately 
at joining WTO (World Trade Organization). 
Following the massacre of pro-democracy demonstrators in Tiananmen Square in 1989, the 
annual renewal of China's MFN status became a source of considerable debate in the Congress; 
a legislation was introduced to terminate China's MFN/NTR status or at least to impose 
additional conditions related to improvements in China's actions on various trade and non-trade 
issues. 
The Clinton presidency from 1992 started with an executive order that linked the renewal of 
China's MFN status with seven human rights conditions, including "preservation of Tibetan 
indigenous religion and culture" and "access to prisons for international human rights 
organizations”. However, Clinton reversed this position a year later. 
In the last year of his presidency, Bill Clinton called on Congress to help him change China’s 
normal trade relations status with the U.S., to permanent. 
After years of negotiations and significant changes to its economy, China became a member of 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) on 11 December 2001. 
By doing so, China could benefit lower tariffs and nontariff barriers to trade and the prevention 
of trade discrimination guaranteed by the rules of WTO. WTO binding rules require non-
discriminatory “national treatment” and “most-favored-nation treatment” for the traded 
products of WTO members, to help exporters and importers to trade as efficiently as possible. 
It also contributed to growth in international trade and investment. 
The conditions in which China agreed to join the WTO, were harsher than them for the other 
developing countries. After China joined the WTO, its service sector was liberalized and 
9 
 
foreign investment was allowed, banking, financial services, insurance, and 
telecommunications were also opened up to foreign investment. 
During the first twelve years of the twenty-first century, the two countries became one another's 
largest or second-largest trade partner. “Figures from both countries show that in 2012 
American exports and imports (in goods, excluding services) were worth US$3.82 trillion, while 
China's total trade volume reached US$3.87 trillion. For the first time, China thus exceeded 
the United States as the world's largest trading nation. The 2012 U.S. trade deficit with China 
was $315.1 billion, a record high.”8 
 
For what concerns the theft of intellectual properties it can be traced back to the entrance of 
China in the WTO when it was demanded to resolve grievances including the protection of 
copyrights and patents. At the time, the combination of the fact that China was a major source 
of pirated musical CD and software and that there was basically no enforcement of laws on 
intellectual property rights, represented a big deal for American companies. But even after the 
entry into the WTO, China kept stealing U.S.’s IP and the problem for the U.S. went on, or 
better, grew, along these years. A similar issue is the one concerning the forced transfer of 
American technology to China. China always forced American companies to transfer 
technology to access the Chinese market, even after the entry into the WTO, and that represents 
a direct violation of its rules. Apparently, those forced technology transfer consists of 
mandatory joint ventures, buying U.S. technology companies and using cyber theft, besides 
forcing American companies to hand over their technologies as a cost of entering the Chinese 
market. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
8 Dong Wang; “U.S.-China Trade, 1971–2012: Insights into the U.S.-China Relationship 米中貿易 
1971〜2012年 中日関係についての洞察”; in The Asia-Pacific Journal Japan Focus; Volume 11 
Issue 24 Number 4 Article ID 3958; Jun 16, 2013 
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1.2 THE DEFINITION AND THE ECONOMICS BEHIND A TARIFF 
 
 
“A tariff is simply a tax on imports. An importer of cars, for example, may be charged $2,000 
for each auto brought into the country. Such a tax will, of course, make automobiles more 
expensive and favor domestic models over imports. It will also raise revenue for the 
government.”9 
Tariffs will reduce international trade and increase the prices of domestically produced goods. 
Domestic producers are, in fact, not forced to reduce their prices as they should if they were in 
competition with foreign producers. The result is that domestic consumers are left paying higher 
prices. In a more competitive market, some companies would not be able to survive, so tariffs 
end up reducing efficiencies by allowing companies to remain open. 
Tariffs limit trade and consumers pay higher prices. This can be justified by some reasons like 
gaining a price advantage for domestic firms, protecting particular industries, or protecting the 
infant industries. 
“A tariff forces foreign exporters to sell more cheaply by restricting their market access. If 
foreign firms do not cut their prices, they will be unable to sell their goods. So, in effect, a tariff 
amounts to government intervention to rig prices in favor of domestic producers. However, this 
technique works only as long as foreigners accept the tariff exploitation passively—which they 
rarely do. More often, they retaliate by imposing tariffs or quotas of their own on imports from 
the country that began the tariff game. Such tit-for-tat behavior can easily lead to a trade war 
in which everyone loses through the resulting reductions in trade”.10 And that’s exactly what 
is happening in the US-China tariff war, with Trump adding tariffs, and China responding with 
more of them. 
“The second, reason why countries restrict trade is to protect particular favored industries 
from foreign competition. If foreigners can produce steel or shoes more cheaply, domestic 
businesses and unions in these industries are quick to demand protection. […] Protective tariffs 
and quotas are explicitly designed to rescue firms that are too inefficient to compete with 
foreign exporters in an open world market. But it is precisely this harsh competition that gives 
                                                             
9 Alan Blinder and William Baumol; “Economics: Principles and Policy”; Cengage Learning, 
2010. 
10 Alan Blinder and William Baumol; “Economics: Principles and Policy”; Cengage 
Learning, 2010. 
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consumers the chief benefits of international specialization: better products at lower prices. 
[…] Industries threatened by foreign competition often argue that some form of protection 
against imports is needed to prevent job losses. […] However, such job gains typically come at 
a high cost to consumers and to the economy. […] Nevertheless, complaints about proposals 
to reduce tariffs or quotas may be justified unless something is done to ease the cost to 
individual workers of switching to the product lines that trade makes profitable. […]Firms may 
be eligible for technical assistance, government loans or loan guarantees, and permission to 
delay tax payments. Workers may qualify for retraining programs, longer periods of 
unemployment compensation, and funds to defray moving costs.”11 About mitigating those 
issues the U.S. government has at its disposal a trade adjustment assistance that provides 
benefits, retraining programs and other aid to workers and firms that lose their jobs or their 
markets to imports. Nevertheless, the Trump tariffs have implemented, and it is possible to 
identify the industries protected as solar panels, the washing machines, steel and aluminum and 
the other products. Although these industries get actually boosted by the tariffs, the protection 
of the industries may not be the main reason for the deployment of the tariffs, also because of 
the declarations of Trump for which apparently the reasons of the tariff should be the trade 
deficit, the theft of IP and technology. 
Technology is involved in the third argument: the need to maintain national defense. 
Other important arguments are: 
The need for the infant-industry for a protected environment, until they are developed and able 
to survive the competition with the international companies.  
The "strategic argument for protection": a nation may have to threaten protectionism to achieve 
the free trade, managing to get the other nations to abandon their protectionist policies. 
 
From an economic point of view, it is possible to compare the free trade equilibrium and the 
introduction of tariffs as in the next figures: 
The first figure shows the benefits of free trade, depicted by the “Z” triangles. Indicating with 
E1 the equilibrium point without trading, (the encounter between the domestic supply and the 
domestic demand) it is possible to see how introducing free trade changes the equilibrium point 
                                                             
11 Alan Blinder and William Baumol; “Economics: Principles and Policy”; Cengage Learning, 
2010. 
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to E2. It lowers the prices from Pa to Pw and increases the quantities from Qa to Ct. The 
consumer surplus (previously W) increases by X+Z+Z (by decreasing the prices they can afford 
more goods) at the expense of the producer surplus, which gets reduced to Y. 
The domestic production will be reduced to Qt (the quantity from Ct to Qt filled by imports). 
The total surplus, however, increases by Z+Z. 
The second figure shows how things change when an import tariff is introduced. Prices rise and 
quantities lower, reducing the consumer's surplus, the area A+B+C+D, in fact, is no more 
consumer's surplus. The producer gains the surplus of A, C represents the government’s revenue 
from the tariff (import quantity times tariff), but the areas B and D are lost, death-weight losses. 
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Charts (Source: Dong Wang; “U.S.-China Trade, 1971–2012: Insights into the U.S.-China 
Relationship 米中貿易 1971〜2012年 中日関係についての洞察”; in The Asia-Pacific 
Journal Japan Focus; Volume 11 Issue 24 Number 4 Article ID 3958; Jun 16, 2013) 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
Donald Trump’s view about trade issues aligns with his "America First" economic policy: 
reduce the United States trade deficit through the renegotiation of the trade agreements and the 
imposition of tariffs. 
During the process of shifting American trade policy from multilateral trade agreements to 
bilateral trade deals many important deals were often criticized by Trump. Two major examples 
are NAFTA, (North American Free Trade Agreement) the agreement which creates the trilateral 
trade bloc among Canada, Mexico, and United States, and the TTP (Trans-Pacific Partnership), 
the trade agreement between more than ten countries including Australia, Japan, and Canada, 
that never took effect because the USA withdrew its signature. 
For what concerns the tariffs, excluding for a moment the trade war with China, which will be 
covered later, he imposed tariffs with most countries, including European Union, Mexico and 
Canada (the famous tariffs on steel (25%) and aluminum (10%)). 
Trump also pledged to impose tariffs to discourage companies from relocating to other 
countries, through an "End the Offshoring Act": “Establishes tariffs to discourage companies 
from laying off their workers in order to relocate in other countries and ship their products 
back to the U.S. tax-free.”12No such action has been introduced in Congress by now. 
 
 
TRUMP’S TRADE WAR AGAINST CHINA TIMELINE 
 
Trump’s “trade war” can be divided into “battles” for an easier approach: the solar panel and 
washing machines, the steel and aluminum and the Chinese products. Also, the tariffs 
imposed by Trump against other countries, like for example the one against South Korean 
products or the proposed "auto tariffs" against Mexico, are not included in this list or are only 
mentioned, focusing on the relation between the United States and China only. 
 
                                                             
12 Donald Trump’s Contract with the American Voter 
18 
 
2.1 THE SOLAR PANEL AND WASHING MACHINES BATTLE 
 
On the 22 of January 2018 Trump imposed safeguard tariffs on solar panels and washing 
machines. 
The reason can be traced back to October 2017, when the U.S. International Trade Commission 
(USITC) determined that “large residential washers are being imported into the United States 
in such increased quantities as to be a substantial cause of serious injury to the domestic 
industry producing an article like or directly competitive with the imported article.”13 
It has been asked to President Trump to impose “global safeguard” restrictions. 
This has been made possible because of Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974. The USITC (US 
International Trade Commission) can investigate whether the domestic industry is injured by 
imports. The commissioners then conduct a vote: if it’s positive or a tie the president can 
implement a policy response, otherwise, a negative vote ends the case. 
In 40 of the 74 investigations, the USITC vote was either affirmative or tie. 
When the USITC vote gives the president the right to proceed with a policy action, the president 
can implement many types of trade barriers, including import tariffs and quantitative 
restrictions. Otherwise, the law permits the president to refuse to impose trade barriers entirely.  
“Indeed, past presidents have implemented trade barriers in only 19 of the 40 cases in which 
an affirmative or tie vote provided the opportunity to implement protection between 1974 and 
2016. This low yield is one reason why Section 201 has been used less frequently than laws like 
antidumping and countervailing duties. Under those other laws, the president plays no role. 
Thus, a USITC finding of injury coupled with the Department of Commerce rulings of unfairly 
low prices (antidumping) or foreign subsidies (countervailing duties) almost automatically 
leads to new import restrictions.”14 
 
 
                                                             
13 https://www.usitc.gov/press_room/news_release/2017/er1005ll841.htm 
14 https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-and-investment-policy-watch/solar-and-washing-machine-
safeguards-context-history-us 
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Table 1: 
 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
 
First 1.2 million units of imported finished 
washers 
20% 18% 16% 
 
All subsequent imports of finished washers 50% 45% 
 
40% 
 
Tariffs on covered parts 50% 45% 40% 
 
Covered parts excluded from tariff 50,000 
units 
70,000 
units 
90,000 
units 
 
These are the terms of the tariffs for three years for imports of large residential washer approved 
by President Trump. 
“Injury to U.S. washing machine manufacturers stems from a sharp increase in imports that 
began in 2012.  The ITC found that imports of large residential washers increased "steadily" 
from 2012 to 2016 and that domestic producers' financial performance "declined 
precipitously."15 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
15 https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2018/january/president-trump-
approves-relief-us 
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Table 2: 
 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 
Safeguard Tariffs on Modules 
and cells 
30% 25% 20% 15% 
Cells Exempted from tariffs 2,5 
gigawatts 
2,5 
gigawatts 
2,5 
gigawatts 
2,5 
gigawatts 
 
These are the terms of the tariffs for four years for imports of solar cells and modules approved 
by President Trump. 
“The relief will include a tariff of 30 percent in the first year, 25 percent in the second year, 20 
percent in the third year, and 15 percent in the fourth year.  Additionally, the first 2.5 gigawatts 
of imported solar cells will be exempt from the safeguard tariff in each of those four years.”16 
This specific move against solar panel imports brings worries on the side of climate mitigation 
and slow the advance of the clean energies. US renewable energy industry is likely to suffer 
from it, since rising the price of solar energy could bring consumers to switch to more carbon-
intensive coal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
16 https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2018/january/president-trump-
approves-relief-us 
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2.2 THE STEEL AND ALUMINUM BATTLE 
 
On March the first, 2018 Trump announced a 25 percent tariff on steel and a 10 percent tariff 
on aluminum on imports from all trading partners. The reason was that these imports threatened 
the national security, since these industries are vital to protect the United States in case of war. 
In 2017, a year before, Trump administration initiated two investigations, that ended covering 
United States imports of $31 billion of steel and $17 billion of aluminum in 2017, a total of $48 
billion of trade. Trump decided to impose tariffs on all countries and products covered in the 
reports. 
The order signed by Trump imposed the steel and aluminum tariffs effective on March 
23. Canada and Mexico were exempted, because of them being members of the NAFTA. Later, 
on 22 March, Europe Union, South Korea, Brazil, Argentina, and Australia got also exempted 
from May 1, 2018. 
25 percent steel tariff where applied to countries that exported $10.2 billion of steel products in 
2017, and 10 percent aluminum tariff to countries that exported $7.7 billion, so the countries 
which have been hit imported a total of $17.9 billion on $48 billion of total steel and aluminum 
imports. In 2017, in fact, Canada and Mexico imported $15.3 billion (summing both steel and 
aluminum) and the other countries exempted through May 1, $14.8 billion. At the end only one 
third of the originally covered imports has been hit. 
The criterion used by the administration to choose who is to be covered has been criticized 
because of being vague. The trade law used by Trump to impose these tariffs (Section 232 of 
the Trade Expansion Act of 1962) resulted been controversial since it provided the president to 
arbitrarily add or subtract trading partners and rise or lower the tariffs.  
The impact on China was less than on other producers, because earlier trade restrictions already 
covered over 90 percent of United States imports of steel products from China, nonetheless, on 
the second of April 2018 China retaliated by imposing tariffs on aluminum, pork (25%), fruits, 
nuts, and much more (15%). 
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2.3 THE CHINESE PRODUCTS BATTLE 
 
This division by stages is personal, it consists in three kind of stages: 
The first stage of tariffs is the 25 percent tariffs on $50 billion of imports imposed both by 
China and the United States. The tariffs have been imposed in two tranches: on $32 billions 
first on 6 July 2019, and on $16 billion on the 23 of August. 
The second stage consists in 10 percent tariffs on $200 billion of Chinese goods and tariffs on 
$60 billion of United States goods that range from 5 to 10 percent. 
The third stage takes place along 2019 and is divided in two phases: 
First phase, the second stage tariffs are increased to 25 percent, for what concerns the $200 
billion of Chinese goods, and on average of 21 percent for the $60 billion Chinese products. 
The second phase consists on the application of a 15 percent tariff on a $112 billion list by the 
United States, and a 5 to 10 percent tariff on $29 billion by China, on September 1st. 
These are the tariffs that have been put in place. From the last stage in September both countries 
decided to work on a deal and so the other tariffs have been delayed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23 
 
2018 
2.3.1 FIRST STAGE 
 
Since the early months of 2018 Trump indicated forthcoming remedies of tariffs on Chinese 
goods (“it could be about $60 billion..”17) under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. The 
tariffs would be imposed due to a report by the Trump administration, finding that China was 
conducting unfair trade practices related to technology transfer, intellectual property, and 
innovation. 
Later in April a $50 billion list of 1333 Chinese products under consideration for tariffs (an 
additional duty of 25%) is released. “The top sectors hit are machinery, mechanical appliances, 
and electrical equipment. Roughly 85 percent of the imports targeted by the tariffs are in 
intermediate inputs and capital goods.”18 
In response China publishes a list of 106 products including automobiles, airplanes, and 
soybeans, subject to a 25 percent forthcoming tariff on a total of $50 billion of China's imports 
from the United States. 
The most classic behaviour in a trade war is set in motion: the tit-for-tat tariffs. If the opponent 
was previously cooperative, the agent is cooperative, if not, the agent is not. The next day, in 
fact, Trump responded saying that he was considering additional tariffs on $100 billion of 
Chinese imports, in order to “fight back”. 
The preparations for the first stage of tariffs were proceeding: in May the White House 
announced that it would impose tariffs on the $50 billion Chinese goods. 
In June it announced the revised list of products, the new list included 818 (in July) plus 284 
(hit in September) out of the original 1333 goods. 
The top added goods were semiconductors and plastics. The goods dropped from the list were 
TV and flat panel screen, together with aluminum and steel. Obviously in the case of aluminum 
and steel it was just because they were covered by the tariffs under Section 232. 
                                                             
17 https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-signing-presidential-
memorandum-targeting-chinas-economic-aggression/ 
18 https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-investment-policy-watch/trump-trade-war-china-date-guide 
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The list targeted even more intermediate inputs, if previously the percentage of consumer goods 
hit were 12 percent, in the new list 95 percent of the products were intermediate or capital 
goods. As it will be explained later, targeting the intermediate goods is often a bad move, 
because it would hit the economy harder.  
Together with the goods list Trump declares that the United States will impose a 25 percent 
tariff on $50 billion of Chinese export. It will be a two phases plan, starting with $34 billion of 
goods starting July 6th, and approximately $16 billion worth of imports on August 23rd. 
China responded the same day with similar tariffs for the United States starting July 6th. It 
released the updated $50 billion list targeting mostly agricultural and food products (38 
percent), the rest are intermediate goods (32 percent) and transport equipment (24 percent). It’s 
possible to see that China avoided United States mistake of hitting too much intermediate 
goods. 
The major differences between the new and the initial list are the addition of mineral fuels, 
some consuming goods and medical equipment, and the exceptions of aircrafts. 
6th July 2018: Both the United States and China imposed the first phase of tariffs on 34$ billion 
of Chinese/U.S. imports. 
 
In response to China's retaliatory tariffs, the White House declared that the United States would 
impose 10 percent tariffs on $200 billion worth of Chinese goods. 
Four days after the first phase of tariffs was imposed, the United States released the list of an 
additional $200 billion of Chinese goods that would be subject to a 10 percent tariff. This time 
the consumer goods were more heavily targeted such as computers, luggage, lamps, furniture. 
True is that there were fewer and fewer supply chain element left to target. 
In August the Trump Administration released a list of Chinese goods worth $16 billion to be 
subject to a 25 percent tariff rate, going into effect on August 23rd. In response, China imposed 
25 percent tariffs on $16 billion of imports from the United States, which were expected to go 
into effect as soon as the Trump administration's tariff list was imposed on August 23rd. 
23rd August 2018: The United States and China followed through with imposing tariffs on $16 
billion of imports. 
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End of the first stage. Actual tariffs into effect: both China and the United States imposed on 
$50 billion worth of imports a 25 percent tariff. The goods interested by the United States tariff 
are capital goods and intermediate goods, like machinery, mechanical appliances, and electrical 
equipment, the consumer goods barely touched. The goods subjected to the Chinese retaliation 
tariffs are transportation: vehicles, aircraft, but also vegetables (soybeans). (See Figure 1 and 
2). 
 
 
2.3.2 SECOND STAGE 
 
In September 2018, the United States announced 10 percent tariffs on $200 billion worth of 
Chinese goods that go into effect on September 24th. The list has been modified from the one 
published in July as a retaliation against Chinese tariffs, but the higher focus on the consumer’s 
goods remained, with a 24 percentage. Trump announces that it will increase to 25 percent on 
January 1st, 2019. 
The day after, China retaliates by imposing tariffs from 5 to 10 percent on $60 billion of United 
States imports. 
24th September 2018: The United States ($200 billion) and the China ($60 billion) tariffs 
announced on September 17th and September 18th go into effect. The imports from China 
would be subjected to a 10 percent tariff, which will increase to 25 percent on January 1st, 2019. 
The United States imports tariffs from China would range from 5 to 10 percent. 
 
End of the second stage. Of the imports targeted by the United States' second stage, 50 percent 
are intermediate goods, like computers and auto parts, 25 percent are capital goods, but 24 
percent are consumer goods. The Chinese tariffs are mainly on intermediate goods (67 percent), 
little on capital goods (7 percent). (See Figures 3 and 4) 
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2.3.3 THIRD STAGE 
 
After the G-20 meeting in Buenos Aires in December, China and the United States achieve a 
truce on the trade war and the planned increases in tariffs that were expected in January 2020, 
are postponed. Nonetheless, according to the Trump Administration, if no agreement regarding 
forced technology transfer, intellectual property protection, and cyber-intrusion is reached by 
March 1st, 2019, the 10 percent tariffs would be raised to 25 percent.  
This increase in tariff would be delayed once again in February. 
2019 
In a sudden reversal, during the United States-China trade negotiations, President Trump stated 
that the United States would increase the 10 percent tariff on $200 billion of Chinese goods, to 
25 on May 10th. The reason being that China reneged upon already agreed deals. He also 
indicated that he would shortly impose 25 percent tariffs on $325 billion of United States 
imports from China. This would be the rest of United States imports from China not yet targeted 
with Section 301 tariffs. The next tariff escalation would hit consumer goods: toys, clothing, 
footwear. 
10th May 2019: The imports from China that were previously hit by a 10 percent tariff under 
the September 2018 action are now subject to a 25 percent rate. 
1st June 2019: China raised retaliatory tariffs on $60 billion worth of United States goods on 
an average of 21 percent.  
Differently from the United States, China decided to reduce tariffs on competing products 
imported from all other countries among 2018, from 8 percent to an average of 6,7 percent. 
China also extended an auto tariff reduction, happened in January 2019, to United States 
exporters, that could have been saw as part of the trade truce of December 2018. But then the 
raise in tariffs in May and the will to impose new tariffs on other goods established by the 
United States, signed that this deal turned out to be premature of almost a year. 
In August, Trump said on Twitter that an additional 10 percent (not 25 percent as he threatened 
in May) tariff will be imposed on the "remaining $300 billion of goods", going into effect 
September 1st, 2019. Included in the list, as already mentioned, final consumers' goods. 
With another August tweet, the Trump administration planned to impose $112 billion worth 
tariffs on September 1st, but to delay the additional, not yet imposed $160 billion to December 
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15th, to avoid harming American customers during the retail shopping season. The September 
tariffs hit, among other things, shoes and clothing, the December tariffs would hit consumer 
electronics. While earlier tariffs hit only the 29 percent of final goods, the September duties 
expand it to 69 percent. For what concerns the December tariffs, which would never be applied, 
some sectors such as toys, footwear, electronics and machinery would have reached the total 
coverage, and in general, almost 96 percent of United States imports would have been affected 
by Trump’s tariffs. 
23 August 2019: “China releases its plan to retaliate on $75 billion of US exports, effective 
September 1 and December 15, 2019, in response to Trump’s forthcoming tariffs on $300 
billion of Chinese goods. The most significant change is that China will increase its average 
tariff on US autos from 12.6 to 42.6 percent. Later the same day, Trump said he would apply a 
15 percent tariff, not 10 percent, on the $112 billion list on September 1 (includes clothing, 
shoes, other back-to-school items) and the $160 billion list on December 15 (includes toys, 
consumer electronics). He also said the current 25 percent tariff on $250 billion of Chinese 
goods will increase to 30 percent, starting October 1”19 
 
In September it becomes possible to see the beginning of a truce: China announces the 
exemption of 16 American product types from the retaliatory tariffs for 1 year (less than $2 
billion of US exports) and Trump announced he would delay the tariff increase on $250 billion 
of Chinese goods, from 25 percent to 30 percent, from October 1st to October 15th. 
In October Trump announced that the United States and China had reached a "first phase deal", 
so he canceled the October tariffs. 
Later, also the scheduled December 15th tariffs were cancelled from both countries and an 
initial deal was announced, the legal text to be signed in January 2020. 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
19 https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-investment-policy-watch/trump-trade-war-china-date-guide 
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2.4 SUMMARY 
 
The first Chart summarizes all the most important events concerning the tariff war and shows 
the trend of the average tariff rate in relation to the main events. 
The first six months of 2018 featured only a moderate increase on tariffs. In this period the only 
tariffs that were actually put into effect were the one on the solar panels and washing machines 
(defined as US Section 201 tariffs), the one on the steel and aluminum (Section 232) and the 
corresponding Chinese retaliation tariffs. According to the Executive office of the president 
“U.S. goods and services trade with China totaled an estimated $737.1 billion in 2018. Exports 
were $179.3 billion; imports were $557.9 billion. The U.S. goods and services trade deficit with 
China was $378.6 billion in 2018.”20.  
Relying on the distribution of solar panel imports in the United States made by the U.S. energy 
information administration21, the photovoltaic module import shipments by China is less than 
8%. Knowing that the global safeguard tariffs approved by President Trump on solar panels 
and washing machines covers $8,5 billion of the first and $1,8 of the latter, the Chinese solar 
panels imports hit by the tariffs are no more than $650 million. According to the investigation 
of the U.S. International Trade Commission, China exported $425 million of washers to the 
United States.22  
For what concerns the tariffs on steel and aluminum, China faced tariffs on $1,1 billion on steel 
and $1,8 on aluminum, for a total of $2,9 billion. 
It is not surprising that the tariff rate didn’t grew substantially, considering that the sum of the 
washing machines, the solar panels, the steel and the aluminum covers only the 1% of Chinese 
imports. 
In a similar way, for what concerns the Chinese retaliatory tariffs for US Section 232 tariffs, it 
covers the US exports for $2,4 billion, not much more than the 1%. 
                                                             
20 https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/china-mongolia-taiwan/peoples-republic-china# 
21 https://www.eia.gov/renewable/annual/solar_photo/pdf/pv_full_2018.pdf 
22 https://www.usitc.gov/publications/safeguards/pub4745.pdf 
29 
 
The months of July through September 2018 had a sharp tariff increase in both sides: China 
average tariff increased from 7,2 to 18,3 percent, and United States average tariff increased 
from 3,8 percent to 12 percent. 
That’s the effect of two stages of tariffs combined: 
United States’ Section 301 tariffs on $34 billion in June, plus the $16 billion in August, and on 
the other side the similar retaliation tariffs imposed by China.  
The September’s tariff on $200 billion goods, imposed from United States, and the retaliatory 
tariff on $60 billion imports by China. 
From then it follows eight months when the tariff rate stabilized, there was in fact no important 
changes in tariffs during that period, until June 2019. United States’ Section 301 tariffs on $200 
billion increased from 10 to 25 percent, and the retaliation on some United States’ product by 
China. And with the tariff of September 2019 of 15% on $112 billion of Chinese imports, and 
China’s retaliation on $75 billion of United States’ exports, the latest phase of tariff increases 
rate kicks in, to peaks higher the 20 percent for both countries. 
With the September tariffs, more than two-third of consumer goods imported from China are 
subject to tariffs, as shown in Chart 2, and if the 15 percent tariffs planned for 15th December, 
that affect $160 billion products, would be taken in action, almost all of the United States’ 
import from China would become affected by the tariffs and the tariff rate would rise over 25 
percent. 
On the other hand, China’s tariffs have been affecting less than $80 billion of United States 
exports, since most of the tariff increases apply to products that China has already hit, so the 
product coverage of the Chinese retaliation is less then 60%. It could expand on December 15th, 
but it would remain less than 70%. One of the contributing factors a such little amount of goods 
covered by the retaliating tariffs, could be the fact that, besides increasing the tariff rate on 
United States’ exports, China reduced tariffs on the competing products imported from 
everyone else to an average of 6,7 percent (from an average tariff of 8 percent). 
The first Chart was updated last on October 11th, before it was known that the December tariffs 
would not be implemented. The second chart offers a summary dated 19th December, which 
includes not only the fact that the tariffs have been called off, but also the reduction to 7,5 
percent of the 15 percent tariffs imposed on September 2019, even if the timing of the cut is yet 
to be determined. 
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There is no difference between the two charts except for the last period: the expected tariff 
reduction will not reduce the share of imports affected by Trump’s tariffs, so the imports 
covered by the tariffs will remain the same, around 64,5 percent. 
The last two Charts (4 and 5) show the composition of goods covered by the tariffs. 
31 
 
Figures: 
Figure 1 (left): US import from China subject to $50 billion of section 301 tariff, by type 
Figure 2 (right): Chinese import from the United States subject to China’s $50 billion list 
 
 
Figure 3 (left): US import from China subject to $2000 billion of section 301 tariff, by type Sep 
17 
Figure 4 (right): Chinese import from the United States subject to China’s $60 billion list 
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Figure 5 (left): Trump’s tweet on 5 May 2019 
Figure 6 (right): Trump’s tweet on 1 August 2019 
 
 
Figure 7 (left): Trump’s tweet on 23 August 2019 
Figure 8 (right): Trump’s tweet on 11 September 2019 
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Charts:  
Chart 1: 
 
34 
 
Chart 2: 
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Chart 3: 
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Chart 4: 
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Chart 5: 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
3. THE IMPACT OF THE TRADE WAR 
 
As written in the first chapter, imposing tariffs is a bad idea.  
It ends up decreasing the consumer’s surplus by raising the prices of imported goods, 
encouraging the buyers to shift from lower-cost foreign sources to higher cost domestic sources.  
It represents also a problem for the industries which see the price of the intermediate or capital 
products they need, rising; this can affect negatively the income and the wages, not to mention 
the fact that these higher business costs will be partially shifted once again onto consumers. 
This could be the case of tariffs on steel, for example. 
Sure, it can help to decrease unemployment, but, as told before, better methods exist for doing 
that without imposing the drawbacks of a tariff on the country. It would also be short-sighted 
to say that tariffs create jobs, considering that it would help the production and employment 
only in the protected industries. Other sectors could be negatively afflicted, the jobs in the 
export sector would decline, as tariffs end implying a tit-for-tat game. The retaliatory tariffs 
from the other country have to be taken into account in advance.  
“Overall, for every dollar gained by domestic producers, domestic consumers lose more than 
a dollar.”23 
It's also very important to consider not only the "mechanical impact" of tariffs but also the 
uncertainty that such a policy can generate about the outlook for global trade. The uncertainty 
curtails the economic activity around the world: the customers would be less confident in 
spending, firms could be reluctantly working in countries following this path, and it is well 
known the negative impact of uncertainty in investments. 
In a bilateral trade war, the results can get complicated, and there are many direct and indirect 
forces coming into play.  
                                                             
23 https://cals.ncsu.edu/agricultural-and-resource-economics/wp-
content/uploads/sites/12/2018/03/Economist-Grennes-May-June-2017.pdf 
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Tariffs will affect the world prices. For a country which is external to the tariff war it could be 
convenient to trade with the interested countries, but it should also be considered the uncertainty 
aspect, so it might want to divert trade around the warring countries. The dimensions of the 
trade shares of the countries imposing tariffs are also strictly related to changes in world prices. 
There would be introduced changes in the real exchange rate, and all countries will shift their 
import countries and the destination of their export, reacting to bilateral trade. Trade diversion 
imposes costs associated with drifting markets. 
High-productivity supply chains could get harmed by a trade war, and countries could switch 
to less productive ones. 
Also, the most productive sectors could shift in response to changes in tariffs, and in that case, 
it would mean reallocating capital across sectors, which is costly.  
Intersectoral linkages have to be considered, the effect of tariffs will reverberate to all sectors 
because of the traded intermediate inputs. 
 
In this chapter, some papers and articles will be exposed in order to try to achieve a complete 
view of what are, and what could be the effect of this trade war on the United States, the Chinese 
and the world's economy. 
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3.1 THE PAPERS 
 
The following is a list of the referenced papers of the chapter, accompanied by the names of 
who wrote them, the publication date and a short description of the data and the methods of 
analysis used by their authors. 
 
“Long-Run Effects on Chinese GDP from U.S.-China Tariff Hikes”, published in June 2019, by 
John K. Ferraro and Eva Van Leemput, underlines some short-medium-term effects of the tariff 
policy which has been already addressed, like the negative effects on consumption and 
investment, the disruption of supply chains and the delaying in investment and hiring. It then 
offers a view on the long-run effects: the slowing of accumulation of capital and the shifting of 
resources from productive sectors into less productive sectors, the reduced extent of 
competition, or the interference with the technological advance. 
With a focus on the long-run effects, the paper gives an interesting point of view on the effects 
of the tariffs on Chinese GDP, on United States GDP and the effect on countries not directly 
involved in the tariff increases. 
The model used to analyze the impact of the recently implemented and proposed tariffs is a 
“trade model developed by Caliendo and Parro (2015), which builds on the seminal model of 
trade and geography of Eaton and Kortum (2002) to include multiple tradable and non-
tradable sectors, input-output linkages, and global imbalances.”24 The countries included in 
the analysis are 30, and the sectors are 40, equally divided between tradable, and non-tradable. 
 
“US-China Trade War: Both Countries Lose, World Markets Adjust, Others Gain”, it was 
published in November 2019, by Sherman Robinson and Karen Thierfelder. It tries to predict a 
three to five years scenario in which the US, China, and the rest of the world have adjusted. It 
then shows the short-term impact of the tariff war among the United States, China, and other 
                                                             
24 Ferraro, John K., and Eva Van Leemput (2019). "Long-Run Effects on Chinese GDP from U.S.-
China Tariff Hikes," FEDS Notes. Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
July 15, 2019, https://doi.org/10.17016/2380-7172.2382. 
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countries on the GDP, imports, exports, and analyses separately the impact on the economic 
sectors of the United States and China. 
In the first scenario, it takes into account the tariffs already adopted, (Since June 2019, when 
the article was written) that totals to $250 billion of Chinese goods and on $110 billion of United 
States goods of imposed tariffs. 
In the second scenario, it would add the tariffs that at the time the article was written were only 
proposed: the increase to 30 percent on the first $250 billion of imports and the addition of a 15 
percent tariff on "the remaining $300 billion". The 15 percent tariff has been applied in 
September on a subset of $112 billion goods, but the 30 percent increase has been delayed, also 
the other subset of $160 billion that would have hit on December 15, has been canceled.  
The analysis is carried out using a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) simulation model 
of the global economy called GLOBE. This type of model is used for analyzing the impacts of 
changes in trade policy. This model includes 16 countries and 42 sectors.  
 
“The Return to Protectionism” by Pablo D. Fajgelbaum, Pinelopi K. Goldberg, Patrick J. 
Kennedy, and Amit K. Khandelwal, with the last draft on 12 October 2019, analyzes the short-
run impact of what it calls "the return to protectionism", on the United States economy. Some 
of those impacts have already been addressed by some other papers like the declines in imports 
and exports and the response of the prices for the foreign exporters that did not fall, implying a 
complete pass-through of tariffs to duty-inclusive prices. 
 
“Shooting oneself in the foot? Trade war and global value chains” is written by Cecilia Bellora 
and Lionel Fontagné, and was published on the 10 of April 2019. The paper addresses the trade 
and welfare effects of the trade tensions by relying on a Computable General Equilibrium model 
named MIRAGE, which differentiates the demand of goods according to them being intended 
for final or intermediate consumption, and then tracing the impact along the value chains. The 
results are expressed as variation with respect to the baseline in 2030.  
 
“The impact of the 2018 Trade War on U.S. prices and welfare” by Mary Amiti, Stephen J. 
Redding and David Weinstein, was published on the second of March 2019, for the Centre for 
Economic Policy Research. It underlines how the trade war, during the 2018, brought an 
increment in prices of both intermediate and final goods, changes in the supply-chain network, 
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the reduction of availability of imported goods and the passing through of the tariffs into the 
prices of the imported goods, with a reduction in U.S. real income of $1.4 billion per month by 
the end of 2018. 
 
 
The last paper and last article are included in order to underly the importance of the impact of 
the trade uncertainty deriving by the trade policy 
 
“How trade policy uncertainty affect global economic activity?” by Dario Caldara, Matteo 
Iacoviello, Patrick Molligo, Andrea Prestipino, and Andrea Raffo. 
 
"Are tariff worries cutting into business investment?" by David Altig, executive vice president, 
and research director in the Atlanta Fed's Research Department; Nick Bloom, the William D. 
Eberle Professor of Economics at Stanford University; Steven J. Davis, the William H. Abbott 
Professor of International Business and Economics at the Chicago Booth School of Business 
and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution; Brent Meyer, a policy adviser and economist in 
the Atlanta Fed's Research Department; and Nick Parker, the Atlanta Fed's director of surveys, 
published the 8 of August on the Federal Reserve of Atlanta blog. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
44 
 
3.2.1 THE IMPACT ON THE GDP 
 
The first paper, “Long-Run Effects on Chinese GDP from U.S.-China Tariff Hikes”, underlines 
a mechanism which is really important in order to understand the impact of the tariffs on the 
GDP: higher United States tariffs on imports from China raises the prices of the intermediate 
goods. This would lower the United States' own productivity and GDP. The same happens in 
China, tariffs decrease demand for the products in which the country is more productive and 
lowers the GDP by pushing the resources into the less productive sectors. For what concerns 
other countries, they could gain by trade diversion but at the same time they could lose as China 
and the United States push resources into less productive sectors. 
This is underlined by the results of the paper, even if the impact of the implemented tariffs 
found by the paper is limited: -0,25 percent on Chinese GDP and -0,19 percent on the United 
States’ GDP. The result can be seen in the first table, together with a scenario in which the 
proposed tariff would have got into effect (We now know that it didn’t happen) and the impacts 
would have been exacerbated. The bilateral trade would be then reduced by more than 50%, the 
GDP would fall by 0,39 percent for China and by 0,31 percent for the United States, which 
admittedly is still not a large effect. 
Figure 1 shows the estimated impact on real GDP of other countries. As preannounced, 
generally the spillovers are negligible, since if they gain from U.S. import diversion, they are 
negatively affected by the lower Chinese demand. Some countries gain because they intercept 
the United States import demand, like Mexico; countries that are more dependent on Chinese 
demand would face lower exports and lower GDP, like New Zealand or South Africa. 
 
The second paper, “US-China Trade War: Both Countries Lose, World Markets Adjust, Others 
Gain” analyzes the effects of the tariffs on the United States’, Chinese and the rest of the world's 
GDPs, in a similar way to what the previous paper did. In this way, it is possible to get a vision 
on both the large and the small period. 
The papers’ views have in common the fact that they consider the effects of these tariffs in 
terms of GDP not so relevant. For what concerns the U.S. GDP it’s between -0,02% (first 
scenario) and -0,07% (second scenario) in the short-period. The Chinese GDP is considered to 
be positively affected in the short run, but only between 0,02 percent and 0,01 percent. This is 
probably due to the combined effect of a less impact on intermediate goods, which China has 
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decided especially to exclude as much as possible from tariffs, and the fact that China was abler 
than the United States in building different trade relations, and to divert its exports to other 
countries. Apparently, this small effect tends to be canceled in the long-run, where the effect of 
pushing resources into less productive sectors tend to prevail. 
 
The third paper, “The Return to Protectionism” obtained that the resulting losses to U.S. 
consumers and firms who buy imports were $51 billion, or 0.27% of GDP, but after accounting 
for tariff revenue and gains to domestic producers, the aggregate real income loss was estimated 
to be $7.2 billion, or 0.04% of GDP. The fourth table represents the "aggregate impacts". 
According to the paper, the aggregate impact can be divided into three components, namely 
EVM, EVX, and the tariff revenue, which are inserted in the first three columns. EVM is the 
increase in the duty-inclusive cost of the pre-war import basket, EVX is the increase in the value 
of the pre-war export basket, and then there is the change in the tariff revenue.  The first row 
reports the monetary equivalent on an annual basis at 2016 prices and the second row reports 
numbers relative to GDP. The first column, which reports EVM, shows that U.S. buyers of 
imports lost in aggregate $51 billion (0.27% of GDP). The second column shows the EVX 
increase of $9,4 billion (0,05% of GDP). The final component is the increase in tariff revenue. 
The effects approximately balance out, leading to a small aggregate loss for the United States 
as a whole, as it is possible to see on the last column of the table, that sums the three components 
of the EV to obtain the aggregate impacts of the war on the United States economy. The 
estimated result is an aggregate loss of $7,2 billion, or 0.04% of GDP (value based on the 2016 
GDP). 
The estimate of the short-run of the PIIE paper ranges from a value that does not consider all 
tariffs, to a value that considers too many tariffs, from 0,02 percent to 0,07 percent. The 0.04 
percent value instead is relative to only the 2018 tariffs (which still are the majority) but 
considers also the retaliatory tariffs of other countries, so this GDP loss estimate is consistent 
with the previously measured one.  
A similar value is also estimated by the paper “The impact of the 2018 Trade War on U.S. 
prices and welfare”:  the cumulative deadweight welfare cost (reduction in real income) from 
the U.S. tariffs is around $6.9 billion during the first 11 months of 2018, with an additional cost 
of $12.3 billion to domestic consumers and importers in the form of tariff revenue transferred 
to the government (that is not accounted as a loss but as a transfer).  
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Losses in the GDP, with some variations among the estimates, are expected by all the papers, 
it is true that the impact is expected to be limited. 
Including all the estimates it would range from -0,02 and -0,07 percent in the short-run and -
0,19 percent on the United States’ GDP. The second paper expects the Chinese GDP to rise in 
a short period, but in the long run, it would be hit in a negative way, with the highest estimate 
of -0,25 percent of GDP. 
 
About the intermediate goods, Figure 6 from “Shooting oneself in the foot? Trade war and 
global value chains” reports the impacts on US bilateral trade flows with major trading 
partners, distinguishing between trade in final and intermediate products. It is observed a 
massive cut in the United States imports of intermediate inputs from China (a -43 percent drop). 
Regarding final goods, the import of United States from China is -28 percent, it's well known, 
in fact, the attempt of the United States to disrupt value chains while limiting the cost of trade 
war beard by the customers. The United States imports diversify their origin, to the benefit of 
the other countries. The Chinese cut in imports from the United States is more limited: -31 
percent cut in intermediate goods, -24 percent for final goods. “The increase in producer costs 
in the US is detrimental to the competitiveness of United States producers and translates into 
price increases and losses of market shares on export markets. This adds to the consequences 
of retaliation by China and other affected countries. […] These results confirm the theoretical 
intuition that trade wars are costly for all trading partners jointly involved in global value 
chains.”25 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
25 “Shooting oneself in the foot? Trade war and global value chains” by Cecilia Bellora and Lionel 
Fontagné. 10 April 2019. 
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3.2.2 THE EFFECT ON EXPORTS AND IMPORTS 
 
According to “Long-Run Effects on Chinese GDP from U.S.-China Tariff Hikes” Chinese 
exports to the United States would be reduced by 33%/159 billion. This is due to the tariffs 
rising prices for United States consumers (or for the producers) and the consequent reduction 
in the demand. The Chinese imports from the United States would be -43%/-58 billion, less 
than the reduction in China's exports to the United States, because China implemented fewer 
tariffs than its rival (approximately half). The negative effects are mitigated by China diverting 
the exports to other countries and by the United States by diverting import demand to other 
countries. 
 
The long-run impact is suggested to be limited. The spillover to the other countries can 
generally be considered positive for the trade diversion, but it brings a negative effect: the fact 
that China and the United States would push resources into less productive sectors whose goods 
would otherwise have been imported. The paper “US-China Trade War: Both Countries Lose, 
World Markets Adjust, Others Gain” states that other countries could benefit from the trade 
war, but it is possible to see that this advantage is not that relevant if we look at the long-run. 
Interesting thing is that Mexico, which is the country that benefits the more, according to the 
last paper, is the worst performer in this one. In the long-run Mexico could gain by substituting 
China as United States’ importer, whether in the short-run it would prevail the fact that its 
economy is linked to the United States, so its exports would decline along with the one of the 
U.S.  
That’s the explanation from the short-run paper, “US-China Trade War: Both Countries Lose, 
World Markets Adjust, Others Gain”: “For the United States, both total exports and total 
imports decline under all scenarios. China, however, can successfully divert its exports away 
from the United States, expanding in other markets and increasing total exports. A chain 
reaction is then set in motion: China increases exports to Europe and countries in East and 
Southeast Asia, which in turn increase their exports to the United States. The United States is 
less able to divert its exports and change sources of imports, many of which are part of supply 
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chains that are difficult to relocate. There is a complex mix of direct and indirect effects at 
work, with different impacts on the two economies. Global trade declines slightly.”26 
The terms of trade worsen for both countries, because of the rising import prices. The other 
countries see their terms of trade rising, probably because of an increment in export prices. 
Figure 2 shows the percent change in real exports from country to country. The results are: a 
decline in both exports from United States to China and from China to United States (from 
United States to China it ranges from -7,32 percent to -14,38 percent and the exports from China 
to the United States it ranges from -5,61 percent to -10,69 percent), also a decline in the general 
exports for the United States (-0,33 percent in the first scenario and -0,86 percent in the second 
scenario) and an increase in general exports for China (again, 0,51 percent in the first, and 0,86 
percent in the second scenario). This last phenomenon is due to the fact that even though the 
export with the United States largely declined, China managed to rise the exports to other 
countries by lowering their relative tariffs, where the United States decline is spread among all 
regions. 
For what concerns other countries, they generally gain from the bilateral tariff war between 
China and the United States. There could be some exceptions, as saw in the previous paper, but 
the general trend is that they benefit from the trade diversion. Trade diversion means that 
trade is diverted from a more efficient exporter towards a less efficient one by entering a free 
trade agreement or, like in our case, by the imposition of tariffs to a country. The total cost of 
goods becomes cheaper when trading within the agreement because of the low tariff, in our 
case it becomes cheaper relative to the country that has been exposed to the tariff. The effect is 
to make Chinese goods more expensive than previously. Therefore, the United States 
consumers switched from some of the imports from China to other countries, prices rose for 
consumers, and demand fell. Consumers tend to lose out because they pay higher prices from 
the less efficient producer, and so the producers do. The situation is different for China, 
following the country's choice of the goods that should have been targeted by the tariffs the 
prices for consumers rose, but the producer's price remained equal.  
Adding the results from the papers, United States exportations to China declines between -7,32 
percent and -14,38 percent in the short run and -43 percent in the long-run. -33 percent is the 
reduction of the exportations from China to the United States in the long run and -5,61 percent 
                                                             
26 Sherman Robinson., and Karen Thierfelder. “US-China Trade War: Both Countries Lose, World 
Markets Adjust, Others Gain”. Peterson Institute for International Economics. November 2019 
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and -10,69 percent is the one in the short run. The long-run effects are, predictably, the short-
term ones that grew bigger. 
 
To see the impact of the tariffs on the imports of the goods interested by it, it is useful to 
introduce another paper: “The impact of the 2018 Trade War on U.S. prices and welfare”. 
Figure 8 shows the total value of imports: a surge in the imports just before implementation, 
and a steep decline in import values after the imposition of tariffs. For what concerns washing 
machines and solar panels, the run-up in imports was probably due to the importers moving 
forward import orders in order to obtain the products before the imposition of the tariffs, but 
also the imports on the remaining goods appeared to be rising a little on average. The drop in 
the imports following the imposition of the tariffs was between 25 and 30 percent. The imports 
in unaffected sectors and countries rose over the same period, which could reflect some 
important substitutions from affected to unaffected countries in response to the tariff changes.  
 
“The return to protectionism” is another paper with a focus on the impact on prices and many 
results regarding varieties. The concept of variety is reported also in the paper “The impact of 
the 2018 Trade War on U.S. prices and welfare”: imported and domestic varieties of goods are 
not perfect substitutes, so the increases in trade barriers can reduce welfare by restricting 
consumer’s ability to purchase new imported varieties. In that paper, the imposition of tariffs is 
associated with a drop in the number of imported varieties entering the United States. Here it is 
defined as country-product pairs, and regarding their imports, the large declines are confirmed, 
import values decline on average by 20 percent and quantities by 23 percent. This can be seen 
both in the fourth figure (a) and in the first column of the second table. 
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3.2.3 THE IMPACT ON PRICES 
 
The paper “US-China Trade War: Both Countries Lose, World Markets Adjust, Others Gain” 
affirms that for the United States, increased tariffs are paid by US consumers. The effect 
consists in an increase of prices and a decrease of the demand. Producers see a rise in the cost 
of imported intermediate inputs, damaging competitiveness. For the Chinese instead, the tariffs 
raise the prices of consumer goods but have a less direct impact on producers, since the Chinese 
have exempted some intermediate inputs. 
 
The paper “The impact of the 2018 Trade War on U.S. prices and welfare” has already been 
nominated before about the impact on prices: it is possible to see in figure 9, the evolution of 
the prices in relation to the tariff waves, suggesting that the tariffs were passed on to U.S. 
importers and consumers. The price index used in the paper takes into account the import shares 
from the countries and the sectors in the twelve months from 2018 among the HTS10 import 
goods in the categories affected by each tariff wave. The six "waves" involve the tariffs imposed 
in 2018 which have been mentioned over and over (but with the addition of one wave: the tariffs 
imposed to Canada, Mexico, and European Union).  The result is that the goods untouched by 
the tariffs show a “flat” price index, so whatever price movements observed in protected sectors, 
are likely due to the tariffs. The prices of the goods subjected to tariffs rose from ten to thirty 
percent. 
Obviously, if the United States government wants to gain something from the trade war, at least 
some of the tariff costs must be absorbed by the foreign exporters. From what it is possible to 
see by the previous analyses, apparently, most of the tariff costs are shifted onto domestic 
prices, and so are born by the consumers. This is confirmed by an ulterior analysis, the results 
are shown in Table 5, which tries to capture the impact on the prices received by foreign 
exporters in relation to a tariff. An estimate of tariffs on the unit value of -0,003 is obtained, 
suggesting that the tariff changes had little-to-no impact on the foreign exporters' prices. The 
dependent variable was then replaced, first by a 12-month change in imported quantities and 
then by the import values. Regarding to the quantities of the imports, one percentage point 
increase in tariffs is associated with a six percentage points fall in import quantities. The result 
is similar between quantities and imported values, which is consistent with the earlier finding 
of no discernible effect on the prices received by the foreign exporters. The imported values 
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fall by 6,5 percent for a one percentage point increase in tariffs. Also, if the foreign exporters 
would have been lowering the pre-tariff prices that they charge for the goods hit by tariffs, some 
evidence would have been founded of an improvement in the terms of trade, which is not the 
case. 
Trying to understand the impact on firms and consumers, the paper focuses also on the markup, 
specifically, on two kinds of markup:  
The first markup is due to tariffs changing the pricing behavior of United States producers by 
protecting them from foreign competition and enabling them to raise prices and markups. It is 
known of course, that as a foreign firm enters the market, as a response domestic firms drop 
prices and markup (output tariff).  
The second markup is due to the effect of the raise of the intermediate goods (input tariff). 
A coefficient of 1.8 is obtained on the weighted input tariff, and there is a clear cost-push 
channel of the tariffs that causes domestic producer prices to rise because their input costs have 
risen. Concerning the competition effect of tariffs in the coefficient on output tariffs, domestic 
producers raise their prices when their foreign competitors are forced to raise prices due to 
higher tariffs, as signaled by the coefficient of 0.49 on the adjusted output tariff change. 
 
By looking at the United States export values (Table 6) it is possible to see a similar trend: there 
is no decrease in the United States exporter’s prices in response to the retaliatory foreign tariffs, 
this means that the foreign importers and consumers are bearing the rise in prices of these goods. 
However, this does not mean that U.S. exporters are not being affected by the retaliatory tariffs: 
a ten percent foreign tariff is associated with a 32 percent decline in the value of U.S. exports.  
 
The paper “Return to protectionism” focuses on variety-level imports: Table 2 reports the 
responses of the United States variety-level imports to the tariff changes. Specifically, the 
results of regressing the four outcomes -values (p*m), quantities (m), unit values (p*) and the 
duty-inclusive unit values (p)- on the tariffs. The decline in import values is matched by a 
decline in quantities. The third column indicates no impact of tariff increases on before-duty 
unit values, this regression suggests a pass-through of tariffs on the United States economy, 
consistently with the figure 4 (b): the before-duty unit values do not change and the duty-
inclusive unit values increase sharply, the tariffs are passing-through to import prices. 
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Similar to what has already been seen in the paper before, the variety-level exports follow a 
similar pattern as the one observed by the imports. The value falls by 24 percent and quantities 
decline by 25 percent at the month of implementation. Another parallelism is the fact that the 
before-duty unit values do not change in response to the tariffs, suggesting the pass-through of 
retaliatory tariffs to foreigner's imports of United States varieties.   
This can be seen also in the values inside Figure 5 and Table 3 that report the regression of the 
four variety-level export outcomes on the retaliatory tariffs. Here too, is underlined a decline in 
both export values and quantities and the lack of evidence that the retaliatory tariffs forced 
United States exporters to lower before-duty product level unit values. Rather it is implied that 
the duty-inclusive export prices rose with the tariffs. 
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3.3 THE IMPACT BY SECTORS 
 
The impact of tariffs can vary from sector to sector, as explained by the papers “US-China 
Trade War: Both Countries Lose, World Markets Adjust, Others Gain”, and “Shooting oneself 
in the foot? Trade war and global value chains”. 
The third figure represents the percentage change in real production, exports, and imports by 
aggregate sectors in both scenarios. The impacts are similar in both scenarios: for the United 
States imports fall in all sectors, production and exports fall in all sectors except for low-trade 
services. Agriculture is hit the hardest. That is the so called "fallacy" at work: tariffs that do not 
protect the traded sectors like manufacturing and lead to a shift toward nontraded sectors. The 
non-selective policy adopted, trying to protect all the industries ends damaging the economy, 
especially agriculture, manufacturing and traded services. 
The Chinese situation is the opposite: except for the imports where all sectors shrink, traded 
sectors expand and low-trade services shrink. This is due to the choice of China to exempt 
imports of intermediate inputs in order to have less impact on producers. This has proved to be 
a provident move, the Chinese manufacture sector, in fact, has been spared, its production grew 
on an absolute level.  
 
The previous paper focused more on the difference between traded and nontraded products, 
where “Shooting oneself in the foot? Trade war and global value chains” goes deeper in 
analyzing the effects on the single sectors. Figure 7 reports the percentage changes in value-
added of the sectors in the United States and China: the upper-right quadrant corresponds to 
sectors winning in both countries (it is empty). The bottom-right are countries winning in the 
United States at the expense of China, here the most important sector is Electronics (9 percent 
decrease in China value-added, 7 percent gain in the United States). In the quadrant where the 
two countries lose, there is only the Food sector, but for small amounts. The last quadrant is the 
most populated, here is where the United States lose and China gain. The most hit sector by 
Chinese retaliation is Oilseeds: -10,5 percent drop, along with it, fiber crops and oath crops and 
other agricultural sectors. 
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3.4 THE IMPACT OF TRADE POLICY UNCERTAINTY 
 
“Trade negotiations and proposals for a new approach to trade policy have become the focus 
of increased attention among investors, politicians, and market participants. While it is possible 
that negotiations will eventually lead to a more open and fair global competitive landscape, 
developments so far have resulted in an increase in uncertainty about the outlook for global 
trade.”27 
As said before, uncertainty can affect investments, hiring, consumer spending, and ultimately 
economic activity around the world. The evidence of trade policy uncertainty affecting the 
economic activity is carried out by a study from the Fed: “How trade policy uncertainty affect 
global economic activity?” by Dario Caldara, Matteo Iacoviello, Patrick Molligo, Andrea 
Prestipino, and Andrea Raffo. 
The note first documents the rise in trade policy uncertainty, through two complementary 
measures based on a text-search analysis: 
One constructed on articles of seven newspapers, namely: Boston Globe, Chicago Tribune, 
Guardian, Los Angeles Times, New York Times, Wall Street Journal, and Washington Post. 
The requirements to be met for an article in order to be selected were the presence of both terms 
related to uncertainty (such as risk, threat, uncertainty) and terms related to trade policy (tariff, 
import duty). 
The other analyses were based on quarterly earnings call transcripts of U.S.-listed corporations. 
An earning call is a conference call between the management of a company, analysts, investors, 
and the media to discuss the company's financial results during a given reporting period.  
The results can be seen in figure 10. The two measures share very similar dynamics: Trade 
Policy Uncertainty reached an initial high in the first half of 2018, and another peak in the first 
half of 2019. 
                                                             
27Caldara, Dario, Matteo Iacoviello, Patrick Molligo, Andrea Prestipino, and Andrea Raffo (2019). 
"Does Trade Policy Uncertainty Affect Global Economic Activity?," FEDS Notes. Washington: Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, September 4, 2019, https://doi.org/10.17016/2380-
7172.2445. 
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In Figure 11 it is possible to see how the rise in TPU in 2018 and 2019 went hand in hand with 
a slowdown in global trade and world industrial production. 
To quantify the effect of trade policy uncertainty on economic activity, a monthly vector auto-
regression (VAR) was estimated. The shocks to Trade Policy Uncertainty affect 
contemporaneously the dollar, the stock prices, the credit spreads, the industrial production for 
the United States, the AFEs (Advanced Foreign Economies), the EMEs (Emerging Market 
Economies), world imports, and United States import tariffs.  
Figure 12 shows in detail the effect of the increase in TPU on the other variables: it lowers 
industrial production in all regions, world imports and equity prices, the dollar is boosted. 
Figure 13 presents the main result. “The total drag on GDP from the two waves of trade tensions 
(the black solid lines) is expected to increase through early 2020, cumulating to an impact of 
just above 1 percent. The effects are similar across the United States, the AFEs, and the EMEs. 
The blue dashed lines show the effect on the GDP of the first wave of TPU alone.”28 
Both the aggregate time-series analysis and the cross-sectional evidence suggest that higher 
trade policy uncertainty has adverse effects on GDP and investment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
28 Caldara, Dario, Matteo Iacoviello, Patrick Molligo, Andrea Prestipino, and Andrea Raffo (2019). 
"Does Trade Policy Uncertainty Affect Global Economic Activity?," FEDS Notes. Washington: Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, September 4, 2019, https://doi.org/10.17016/2380-
7172.2445. 
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Tying the trade policy uncertainty directly to the trade war is the article called "Are tariff 
worries cutting into business investment?"   
The survey elicits the expectation of more than 300 firms regarding capital expenditures, 
employment, sales growth, and costs.  
Firms capital investment plans are in fact affected by tariffs and by the fear of more to come. 
From the raising of domestic investment for the newly protected industries, to the delaying of 
investment caused by uncertainty, to the negative effects caused by the rise in input costs or the 
curtailing of the demand for United States exports caused by the retaliatory tariffs. 
The survey consists of three questions:  
“Have the recently announced tariff hikes or concerns about retaliation caused your firm to 
reassess its capital expenditure plans?” to which one-fifth of the respondents answered 
positively. The answer could be different among different sectors, those worries are predictably 
higher for the goods-producing firms (thirty percent in manufacturing) then service-providers 
(fourteen percent among service-providers). Of course, manufacturing firms are more engaged 
in international commerce. 
"How have recent tariff hikes or concerns about retaliation caused your firm to reassess its 
capital expenditure plans?" Among the firms that responded positively to the question before, 
the main form of reassessment is to place planned capital expenditure under review (67 
percent), some have postponed or dropped them (22 and 9 percent), some other accelerated 
their plans (14 percent) and one firm added new capital expenditures (2 percent). 
“How much tariff worries affect your previously planned capital expenditures?” Among firms 
reassessing, an average of sixty percent of their capital expenditure plans is affected. 
These findings could, at a first view, suggest that tariff worries did not actually affect that much 
United States business investment. But according to the authors of the article, there are sound 
reasons for concern. 
First, some industries, have been affected by a high percentage, like the thirty percent of 
manufacturing, so the investment effects of trade policy frictions are concentrated in a sector 
that accounts for much of business investment. 
Second, this article has been published in August 2018, so as it takes into account some threats 
that were not translated already into effective tariffs, at least in terms of value. Since the tariff 
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war would have escalated from that point, it is not capturing the highest impact of uncertainty, 
that could have been higher later on. 
 
 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter explained the consequences of the trade war for the United States and China and 
what would they be, by focusing on some macroeconomic indicators such as GDP, exports and 
imports, and prices. Following, these results will be summed up to offer a general framework 
of the impacts of this trade war. 
 
The impact on GDP would be negative in the long-run for both countries, with direct effects 
estimated as -0,25 percent GDP for China and -0,19 percent GDP for the United States. By 
implementing a persistent increase in tariffs, the prices of the United States’ intermediate goods 
would raise, lowering the production and ultimately the GDP. Chinese GDP would instead be 
lowered by the reallocation in less productive sectors. This would be caused by the decrease in 
the demand for the Chinese goods that got hit by the tariffs, since the above-mentioned raise of 
their prices. 
The tariffs could affect global growth in the short-period through different channels: the first is 
the negative effect in consumption and investment, caused not only by the rising of the prices, 
but also by the impact of uncertainty, especially for the delaying in investment. (These two 
themes will be treated separately later). The other channel through which the tariffs effect 
operates in the short-run is the disruption of supply chains. In the specific case of this trade-
war, both countries have to face it, but China manages to limit its impact in a better way, 
especially with its exports, that were increased towards Europe and countries in East and 
Southeast Asia. The United States instead, is less able to divert exports and change sources of 
imports. So, among the short-period, the United States loses, due to the increase in tariffs, from 
-0,02 percent to -0,07 percent of its GDP. China instead, should manage to prevent this 
reduction, its GDP in fact, would even rise a little from 0,01 percent to 0,02 percent. The lesser 
impact on China is due to the two already faced reasons: the fact that it tried to harm the 
intermediate goods as little as possible, and the fact that it was more able to divert its exports, 
contrary to its rival. 
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Speaking of the impact of persistent tariffs on the exports, the results suggest that it would be 
relevant in the long-run, as in the short-run, as it would be expected by a trade war.  
-33 percent of Chinese exports to the United States and -43 percent of Chinese imports from 
the United States during the long-run. The Chinese exports to the United States would range 
from -5,61 percent to -10,69 percent in the short-run whether the Chinese imports from the 
United States in the short-run would be from -7,32 percent to -14,38 percent. 
Regarding general exports, in the short term the United States would fall from -0,33 percent to 
-0,86 percent, and the Chinese instead would rise from 0,51 percent to 0,86 percent. The reason 
for this rise signals the aforementioned export diversion. 
The prices for the goods subject to tariffs rose from 10 to 30 percent. This rise is not only caused 
by the so called “input tariff”, that refers to the cost-push channel of the tariffs that causes 
domestic producer’s prices to rise because their input costs have rose. It is also related to the 
protection from competition these industries gained, that allows them to rise prices and markup. 
The results of various papers seem to agree that the tariffs are paid ultimately by consumers and 
importers. By looking at the prices for the foreign exporters it is possible to see that they did 
not lower in response to the tariffs, instead they remained more or less the same, meaning that 
the rise of prices is passed through importers and consumers.  Anyway, the same thing happens 
for what concerns the retaliatory tariffs that hit United States exporters, with the prices for the 
exporters kept unchanged and all the tariffs passed though foreign importers and customers. 
It may be also interesting to look the sector level, to understand what sectors could be affected 
the most by the tariffs, and if the impact would be positive or negative. Among the United 
States, all sectors have been hit negatively by the tariffs, both in terms of production, ad in 
terms of exportations and importations. The only exception would be low-trade services. There 
is the “fallacy of composition” at work: broad-based tariffs that attempts to protect many 
manufacturing industries simultaneously, can hurt manufacturing as a whole, leading to a shift 
away from traded sectors toward nontraded sectors. 
Vice versa for China, where the impact on production, importations and exportations is overall 
positive except for low-traded services. This result is derived by its decision to exclude tariffs 
on manufactured goods. 
In terms of value-added on the single sectors, the sector that got hit the more by the tariffs is 
the manufacturing sector for the United States, in addition to the agriculture sector as a whole: 
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oilseed, fiber crops, cereals vegetable and fruit. For China the most affected sector is the 
electronics sector, machinery and metal are also affected, but to a lesser extent. 
At last, uncertainty. The impact of the uncertainty deriving from the instability of the trade war 
must not be undervalued, since it is suggested that higher trade policy uncertainty has adverse 
effects on GDP and investment. Specifically, we underlined before the results of a survey that 
determined how one-fifth of the sample reassessed its capital expenditure plan because of the 
worries caused by the tariff war. The main form of reassessment being to place their capital 
expenditure plan, on average sixty percent, under review. 
We saw how the trade war had and would have some undesirable effects among not only the 
United States and China, but also among the global economy. Negative impacts on GDPs, rise 
of prices and a decline in global trade, these are the consequences. In the next chapter it will be 
exposed the phase one deal, the first step towards the end of this trade conflict, with a hope that 
the situation will develop towards a brighter future. 
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Tables 
 
 
Table 1: Cumulative Effect on Real GDP Growth and Trade (from “Long-Run Effects on 
Chinese GDP from U.S.-China Tariff Hikes”) 
 
 
 
Table 2: Variety-level import responses to import tariffs (from “The Return to Protectionism”) 
 
 
Table 3: Variety-level export responses to retaliatory tariffs (from “The Return to 
Protectionism”) 
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Table 4: Aggregate Impacts (from “The Return to Protectionism”) 
 
 
Table 5: Impact of U.S. Tariffs on Importing (from “THE IMPACT OF THE 2018 TRADE WAR 
ON U.S. PRICES AND WELFARE”) 
 
 
Table 6: Impact of Foreign Tariffs on U.S. Exporting (“THE IMPACT OF THE 2018 TRADE 
WAR ON U.S. PRICES AND WELFARE”) 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1: The spillover to other countries (from “Long-Run Effects on Chinese GDP from U.S.-
China Tariff Hikes”) 
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Figure 2: (from “US-China Trade War: Both Countries Lose, World Markets Adjust, Others 
Gain”) 
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Figure 3: (from “US-China Trade War: Both Countries Lose, World Markets Adjust, Others 
Gain”) 
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Figure 4: Variety Event Study: Imports (from “The Return to Protectionism”) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Variety Event Study: Exports (from “The Return to Protectionism”) 
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Figure 6: Impact on United States trade flow (from “Shooting oneself in the foot? Trade war 
and global value chains”) 
 
Figure 7: Relative changes in value-added, by sector, in 2030 (%)) (from “Shooting oneself in 
the foot? Trade war and global value chains”) 
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Figure 8: 12-month Proportional Change in Import Prices by Tariff Wave “THE IMPACT OF 
THE 2018 TRADE WAR ON U.S. PRICES AND WELFARE” 
 
Figure 9: Total Import Values by Tariff Wave “THE IMPACT OF THE 2018 TRADE WAR ON 
U.S. PRICES AND WELFARE” 
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Figure 10: (from “HOW TRADE POLICY UNCERTAINTY AFFECT GLOBAL ECONOMIC 
ACTIVITY?”) 
 
Figure 11: (from “HOW TRADE POLICY UNCERTAINTY AFFECT GLOBAL ECONOMIC 
ACTIVITY?”) 
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Figure 12: (from “HOW TRADE POLICY UNCERTAINTY AFFECT GLOBAL ECONOMIC 
ACTIVITY?”) 
 
Figure 13: (from “HOW TRADE POLICY UNCERTAINTY AFFECT GLOBAL ECONOMIC 
ACTIVITY?”) 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
4. ALL’S WELL THAT ENDS WELL (OR NOT?) 
 
On the fifteenth of January 2020, in the White House, Donald Trump, and the vice-premier, Liu 
He, signed the first preliminary trade deal. Following, the details of the deal released by the 
United States Trade Representative. 
 
 
4.1 PHASE ONE OF THE TRADE DEAL 
 
China agreed to increase purchases of American goods and services by at least $200 billion 
over the next two years. The increase in purchases will be compared to 2017 before the trade 
war began when China imported $130 billion in U.S. goods and $56 billion in services. These 
$200 billion of goods will be divided in this way (reminding that all these values should be 
added to the respective 2017 baseline imports): 
$77.7 billion in additional manufacturing purchases over two years, which will be $32.9 billion 
increase in 2020 and a $44.8 billion increase in 2021. At least $52.4 billion in additional energy 
purchases over the two years, that will be broken into $18.5 billion additional in 2020 and $33.9 
billion in 2020. $37.6 billion in services from U.S. companies over the two years, $12.8 billion 
level in 2020 and $25.1 billion, in 2021. 
In addition to the $200 billion, China shall ensure purchases of the United States agriculture 
products by $32 billion over two years, $24 billion in 2020 and $19.5 billion in 2021. 
In exchange, America will reduce the tariffs imposed in September 2019 on $120 billion 
Chinese goods by half, from 15 percent to 7 percent. The other tariffs on Chinese goods that 
were put in place earlier remained unchanged: “As soon as this kicks in we’re starting phase 
two,” Trump said. “I will agree to take those tariffs off if we’re able to do phase two, otherwise 
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we don’t have any cards to negotiate with.”29 Of course, all the tariffs scheduled in December 
have been suspended indefinitely, both from the United States and China.  
The deal provides also better protection to American companies that have long complained 
about thefts of intellectual property and trade secrets, by including stronger Chinese legal 
protections such as criminal and civil procedures to combat online pirated goods. 
The deal also binds China with strong restrictions on competitive currency devaluation to gain 
a trade advantage. China agreed to publish relevant data on exchange rates as an enforceable 
commitment, as for any violation they could incur United States tariffs. 
“The United States and China will resolve differences over how the deal is implemented 
through bilateral consultations, starting at the working level and escalating to top-level 
officials. If these consultations do not resolve disputes, there is a process for imposing tariffs 
or other penalties.”30 
Additionally, the agreement would help to open the Chinese financial services market, which 
was limited by investment barriers, including foreign equity limitations and discriminatory 
regulatory requirements.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
29 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-01-15/u-s-china-sign-phase-one-of-trade-deal-
trump-calls-remarkable 
30 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-china-details-factbox/whats-in-the-u-s-china-phase-1-
trade-deal-idUSKBN1ZE2IF 
73 
 
4.2 AN ANALYSES OF THE CONSEQUENCES 
 
To begin, the phase-one trade deal has been received in a tepid way by almost all the observers. 
The majority does not appear to be satisfied and some doubt that the deal will last until 2021. 
Following, some of the main arguments of the critics, that have been here summarized by Tim 
Drayson, Head of Economics at Legal & General Investment Management (LGIM): “First, the 
majority of the existing tariffs remain in place, with no timetable for their removal. Second, it 
will be difficult for China to meet its target for purchases of US goods. Third, the deal lacks a 
credible enforcement mechanism. Finally, progress on the key structural issues remains 
extremely limited."31 
 
The fact that the trade deal is insufficient. It is underlined how the deal does not really address 
some of the key issues that were ultimately the reasons of the conflict, that according to Dr. 
Kerstin Braun, President of Stenn Group would be: “China’s preferential support of state-
owned enterprises and technology transfer from American companies doing business there. 
Both sides need to accept the larger picture. For the US, it’s that China as an economic power 
is not going away. For China, it’s that to be in the world marketplace means complying with 
international business standards.” 
A lot of the experts are skeptical about the capability of the Chinese government to fulfill its 
promises about the purchases of American goods. Not only that, many are wondering what will 
happen in 2022 when the deal will expire. Nick Marro, an analyst at The Economist Intelligence 
Unit, points out that the Chinese demand would be artificially generated because it does not 
follow the rules of the market. Once the two years frame would be up, the demand which will 
reflect the actual Chinese goods demand will fall, at the expense of the farmers that will have 
invested in the domestic production on the expectation of Chinese demand. He says: "The trade 
war has demonstrated the problems of overexposure to a single market. But rather than 
encouraging export diversification, the trade deal risks exacerbating this over-reliance through 
its purchase targets.” 
                                                             
31 https://www.theguardian.com/business/live/2020/jan/15/us-china-trade-deal-trump-tariffs-global-
risks-uk-inflation-business-live?page=with:block-5e1f53fe8f0852212f74eabc#block-
5e1f53fe8f0852212f74eabc 
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The deal lacks a credible enforcement mechanism. Some, in fact, argue that with a weakened 
World Trade Organization, this will bring only to more trade squabbles.  
 
 
Indeed, the deal does not address the key issues, but in my opinion, if it did it would have really 
been “the biggest deal ever seen”32. It is unlike that these structural problems, such as the United 
States trade deficit or the theft of intellectual property, or the forced transfer of American 
technology to China will be solved by a single deal. Also, it would be harder to achieve for the 
United States alone, they might need the support of other nations, and institutions, they may 
need the help of WTO. Of course, as already underlined, it would be harder from now on even 
to enforce this one deal, because of the WTO being strongly weakened by Trump. This brings 
to another point, the perspective from where one looks at the deal. Trump’s perspective about 
it is not America’s, and the President have interests that can differ from the interests of the 
country. “The trade deal, if it holds, could be a major political boost for Trump in an election 
year when he can argue his tough stance with China has paid off. US stock markets hit new 
record highs ahead of the signing.”33 So maybe Trump would prefer to bring home what he 
can show to his electorate as a victory, which has already start doing, then to “bite more then 
he can chew”.  
It is true that some of the key issues stay unsolved, whether they are faced in an inadequate way 
or not even addressed. It is also true that this is a phase one deal, so maybe this is only a part of 
a longer-horizon plan and the issues will be settled within the other phases of this deal. 
“We’re certainly glad it’s not getting worse” said Stephen Lamar, president of American 
Apparel & Footwear Association, and this can express my point of view: the situation previous 
to tariffs could be restored since both countries lost at the tariff war, and so it wouldn't be in 
their interest to worsen it. Relying only on the phase one deal, the situation could improve in 
pretty much all terms, with the acquisitions from China raising United States exportations to 
China and GDP, especially sectors like agriculture or manufacturing that were hit hard by the 
tariff war will see an improvement. It’s also important to remember that almost all of the tariffs 
are still in place, so I’m not sure about an enhancement of the importations and of the prices of 
                                                             
32 https://www.theguardian.com/business/2020/jan/15/us-china-trade-deal-donald-trump 
33 https://www.theguardian.com/business/2020/jan/15/us-china-trade-deal-donald-trump 
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these goods for the importers and the customers. During this year new phases could come out, 
and at the end of the year the situation won’t be much better, but won’t be worst, with Trump 
leaving that “work in progress” to use it during his political campaign. After that, it will be 
relevant to see who the new administration will be and whether go on with Trump’s policy, 
would be in its priorities. Anyway, China could maybe give up on something, but I don’t think 
the economic balance will be changed in favor of the United States, because I'm not sure that 
the United States has the upper hand anymore. 
For example, yes this deal might be a progress in the field of the IP theft, but it's a big step from 
here to say that this will totally solve the problem, and at this point, I can't imagine a deal that 
could manage to do it, as I'm not sure that a solution could exist no more. 
 
 
4.3 CONCLUSION 
The phase one deal has been signed. New purchasing from China, the cut of some United States 
tariffs, legal protections concerning intellectual property, an agreement on currency, and one 
on the Chinese financial market are included in the deal. 
The reception was tepid, and some accused the deal to be insufficient, China not to comply with 
the deal, and anyway, it was underlined how there was no efficient mechanism of enforcement.  
Albeit all the critics to this phase one deal, it has to be said that this deal still improved a 
situation of uncertainty. This is testified by the lifting of stocks the exact same night that the 
deal was signed. Being that there has been a substantial risk for the trade war to start a global 
recession, these fears seems, if not overcome, at least cooled down. 
Anyway this is just a partial result, and it should be cautious to wait new developments before 
claiming that this trade war is over. It is important to see how the situation will develop in the 
mid-term, if the two parties will be able to stick to the agreement and what will be the following 
phases of the deal. 
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